Islam and the Secular State – Negotiating the Future of Shari a
Islam and the Secular State Negotiating the Future of Shari a
What should be the place of Shari'a — Islamic religious law — in predominantly Muslim societies of the world? In this ambitious and topical book, a Muslim scholar and human rights activist envisions a positive and sustainable role for Shari'a, based on a profound rethinking of the relationship between religion and the secular state in all societies.
An-Na'im argues that the coercive enforcement of Shari'a by the state betrays the Qur'an's insistence on voluntary acceptance of Islam. Just as the state should be secure from the misuse of religious authority, Shari'a should be freed from the control of the state. State policies or legislation must be based on civic reasons accessible to citizens of all religions. Showing that throughout the history of Islam, Islam and the state have normally been separate, An-Na'im maintains that ideas of human rights and citizenship are more consistent with Islamic principles than with claims of a supposedly Islamic state to enforce Shari'a. In fact, he suggests, the very idea of an "Islamic state" is based on European ideas of state and law, and not Shari'a or the Islamic tradition.
Bold, pragmatic, and deeply rooted in Islamic history and theology, Islam and the Secular State offers a workable future for the place of Shari'a in Muslim societies.
(20080621)
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5 Stars The Liberal Age is not entirely over . . .
It may seem at times as if Islamic political thought has been captured by Qutb, Maududi, and their intellectual descendents. It is hard to remember that from about 1840 to 1940 (the period that Hourani terms the "Liberal Age"), the dominant strain in Muslim political thinking was comprised of the work of Tahtawi, Kayr al-Din, Afghani, Abduh, and Rida, who struggled above all to combine the moral weight of Islam with the science and rationalism of the West. Their goal was to create societies that were progressive and humanist while remaining identifiably Islamic.
The failure of the Islamic modernists was not going far enough — not finding a new understanding of Islam's relationship to both the socio-historical world and the physical universe. An-Naim is clearly working in this Islamic liberal tradition, but his work has greater promise since he offers what his precursors feared to — a new synthesis of Islam and politics that goes beyond the traditionalist understanding of the Shariah.
His initial premise is that if Muslims are to be Muslims, the state must remain secular. The Quran tells us clearly that there is no coercion in religion. A state created along the lines set out by Maududi and Qutb, one that would coerce belief, would foreclose the only path to true religious practice — the path of the religious seeker, finding her own way to draw near to God.
A secular state does not mean one that is outside the influence of religiously motivated Muslims. Individuals can not hope to divorce their religious beliefs from their participation in politics. But policies that incorporate religiously inspired input must be adopted as a result of open, democratic dialogue. In An-Naim's terms, policy congenial to the Muslim community must be adopted through the process of civic reason, not imposed by the state. In order to protect this process, he calls for a constitutional order, a theory of individual equal citizenship, and the guarantee of individual human rights.
One of the most valuable components of the book is An-Naim's impressive scholarship that establishes the fact that the Shariah in concept is an unchanging, comprehensive body of divine law; but that in historical terms it has always been applied by human beings who engaged in "ijtihad", or independent reasoning, to discern what the divine law actually requires of timebound human beings in historical situations. This is a useful counterpose to the position of the Islamic militants who argue, in Maududi's terms, that the Shariah "makes God's regulations very clear and specific and thus provides guidance for the regulations of how man should live". All experience with fundamental law, whether it be the Shariah, the Ten Commandments, or the American Constitution, argues that an-Naim's position is correct and Maududi's is wrong.
An-Naim goes farther than the original Islamic liberals by calling for a basic shift in the interpretation of the Shariah based on the work of Ustadh Mahmoud Mohamed Taha. The new paradigm would emphasize the verses in the Quran that were revealed to Muhammad during the Maccan period rather than the Medinan period. The revelation of the Medinan period was intended for a community surrounded by enemies and at war. That of the Maccan period emphasized more the universal doctrines of Islam. A focus on the latter is more in keeping with the requirements of an Islamic community that is a strong component of an open, democratic, and secular state.
There is more of value in this book. Suffice it to say that it is a required read for those who are interested specifically in the development of Islamic law, and more generally in identifying voices in the Islamic world who call for Muslims to find ways to embrace the future rather than reacting to the past.
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I found the analysis presented by one of the reviewers of An-Naim`s book on Islam and Secular State very interesting and my interest is because of his comparison of Muadudi on the one hand and An-Naim on the other hand. In this regard I would like to annex few observations:
I am unable to comprehend the above referred review on the basis of its development of binary picture of Muadudi and An-Naim, as if Muadudi was not advocating any thing else than coercive state and An-Naim is visualising that state can be without any coercion. I think this depiction is not fair for both of above referred Muslim scholars. What I think that both of the above referred Muslim thinkers Muadudi and An-Naim are influenced by Western model of state, but difference is that when Muadudi developed his ideas that was the time when coecrcive aspect was on the forefront, while when An-Naim is responding to issue of Islam and state western state is attempting to develop more individualistic posture. So, this difference of their location is providing them a basic assumptions of their theorisation of Islam and its relationship with state. While commenting in this way, I am fearful that I might be understood as if I am regarding their contributions as product of objective structure of today`s world. If this is so, why have so many others come out to theorise like this? What I intend to highlight that their contributions are original but not free from their own contexts.
There is another aspect which I would like to point out that I am unable to digest that Muadudi was only supporting an idea of coecrcive state and there was not any shadow of liberty in that state on the one hand, on the other hand, what An-Naim is doing it is only premised on assumption that we may have a state which would be totally free from any taint of coercion. This appears to be a incorrect reading of both Muslim thinkers, although there is visible difference between employment of coercion by state in both`s ideas, but it would be wrong to read one as if suggetsing hundred percent coercion and the other as hundred percent freedom and individualism.
If we analyse Muadudi`s idea of state, we will come to know that he is continously insisting individual freedom to exercise his/her religion but this insistence is sidelined by his persistenet claim that state apparantus can be employed to facilitate or lead religious life. On the other hand An-Naim is asserting it would be against religious aspect of Islam that if it would be induced by state, so far as individual observance is concerned, he appears very close to Muadudi.
Therefore, the pivotal issue which remains to be discussed is whether we can imagine a state which would be neutral in religious affairs? An-Naim`s assumption is that it can happan and Muadudi`s assumption is that it cannot happan that is why he has thrown his weigth in favour of that state which may be employed to induce religious life. Without giving much time to criticise, I would like to raise the issue that it is not something very imaginable to visualise a stat which can be nuetral in true sense of the world. No one is nuetrul in way that no one has any particular idea. This will be a situation of that state which would follow ideas of any majority or derived on the basis of civic reason. Once state has adopted a particular idea, it would be against the principle of neutrallity, because then state would not remain so. If we assume that state would not impose its ideas or views on the basis of support by majority or dervied from civic reason, then question may be asked, what is the benefit of adopting any particular view by that state? If situation has to be same before and after adoption of any views/ideas, then it would be advocating against An-Naim`s idea of civic reason. So what is the benefit of this whole process of civic reason, if something after maturing through it is not liable to be enforced on those who are not willing to subscribe this particular view. This is a juncture where I feel difficulty to dissociate An-Naim`s state from coercison. I am not pointing that this coercion would be material or physical, but atleast it would be symbolic in my understanding. This is a place where I perceive An-Naim`s state cannot be kept away from coercive element of state.